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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a growing controversy has surrounded efforts 
by Republicans to disqualify Democratic voters through the 
technique of vote caging.  This technique gained national attention 
on May 23, 2007 during U.S. House Judiciary Committee hearings 
on the firing of nine U.S. attorneys in 2006.  The attorneys were 
fired for reasons alleged to be improperly political and irrelevant to 
their job performance.1
Monica Goodling, a former senior counsel and White House 
liaison to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, told the committee 
       †  Chandler Davidson is the Radoslav Tsanoff Professor of Public Affairs 
Emeritus at Rice University. 
      ††  Tanya Dunlap holds a Ph.D. in History from Rice University.  She 
currently works as an independent scholar. 
     ††† Gale Kenny holds a Ph.D. in History from Rice University where she is a 
Lecturer in the History Department. 
    ††††  Benjamin E. Wise teaches history and academic writing at Harvard 
University.  He will receive his Ph.D. in History from Rice University in 2008. 
 1. See generally Fired U.S. Attorneys, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2007 (showing a chart 
of the names, pictures, offices, job review excerpts, and cases of the nine fired 
attorneys); Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Number of Fired Prosecutors Grows, WASH. 
POST, May 10, 2007, at A10. 
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that Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, who had recently 
resigned as the Justice Department’s number two official, was less 
than candid in his February testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee.2  McNulty testified about Timothy Griffin, 
who was appointed on an interim basis—without the normal 
confirmation hearing—to replace the U.S. attorney in the Eastern 
District of Arkansas.3  Griffin was a former opposition researcher 
for the Republican National Committee (RNC) and aide to White 
House political advisor Karl Rove.4  According to Goodling, 
McNulty did not reveal to the senators information about 
allegations that Griffin was involved in “caging” African-American 
votes in 2004.5  When Goodling was asked during her testimony to 
explain the term, her response was so vague that it was unclear why 
she thought McNulty should have revealed information about a 
caging operation, and no committee member asked her for 
clarification.6  The issue continued to gain attention, particularly 
on political blogs, when Griffin suddenly resigned his interim 
appointment as U.S. attorney a few days after Goodling’s testimony 
       2.    Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Goodling Says She ‘Crossed the Line,’ WASH. POST, 
May 24, 2007, at A1. 
 3. Jason McClure & Emma Schwartz, Goodling Admits to ‘Crossing the Line’; 
Denies Major Role in Attorney Firings, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 2007, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1179911108382&pos=ataglance. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  McNulty had reportedly angered Goodling, Gonzales, and others in 
his earlier congressional testimony, in part because he had said that H. E. 
Cummins III, the U. S. Attorney whom Griffin replaced, had been dismissed 
“solely to make room for J. Timothy Griffin, who had been named as the 
temporary successor with the backing of Karl Rove, the senior White House 
political adviser.”  David Johnston, Gonzales’s Deputy Quits Justice Department, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A15.  After Goodling’s testimony about the caging, 
McNulty strongly denied her assertions.  “Ms. Goodling’s characterization of my 
testimony is wrong and not supported by the extensive record of documents and 
testimony already provided to Congress,” he said in a statement.  David Johnston 
& Eric Lipton, Ex-Justice Aide Admits Politics Affected Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2007, at A1. 
 6. Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee (CQ Transcripts Wire), 
WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/ 
transcripts/goodling_testimony_052307.html.  In response to the question from 
Rep. Linda T. Sanchez, “Can you explain what caging is?” Ms. Goodling stated:  
You know, my understanding—and I don’t actually know a lot about it—
is that it’s a direct-mail term that people who do direct mail, when they 
separate addresses that may be good versus addresses that may be bad.  
That’s about the best information that I have, is that it’s a direct mail-
term that’s used by vendors in that circumstance.
Id. 
2
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and shortly before his Senate confirmation hearing would have 
been held.7  In a speech recorded on C-Span, he strongly denied 
having participated in vote caging, although he also did not define 
it.8
As these events were unfolding, the updated paperback edition 
of Armed Madhouse9 by Greg Palast, a muck-raking American 
journalist employed by the BBC, appeared in bookstores across the 
nation.  Following Goodling’s testimony, Palast also became active 
in the liberal blogosphere, describing what he called Republican 
“vote caging” efforts in 2004 that focused on Jacksonville, Florida, a 
city with a large African-American population.10  Indeed, it was 
primarily because Palast publicized the events in Florida that the 
issue received as much attention as it did.11
In June 2007, Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy and 
Sheldon Whitehouse sent a letter to Attorney General Gonzales 
requesting, to no avail, information about Griffin’s role in the 2004 
vote caging operation.12  Invoking executive privilege, the Bush 
administration has refused to honor requests and subpoenas issued 
by both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees regarding the 
firing of the U.S. attorneys and related events that would have shed 
 7. See Posting of Max Brantley to Arkansas Blog, It’s Official, 
http://www.arktimes.com/blogs/arkansasblog/ (May 30, 2007, 17:58 CST). 
 8. Tim Griffin on Vote Caging (C-Span television broadcast June 14, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TeDrHjagQCk; see also E-mail from Kelly 
Porter to Tim Griffin et al., Research Dir. and Deputy Commc’ns Dir. Republican 
Nat’l Comm. (Aug. 25, 2004, 17:47 EST), http://2004.georgewbush.org/dead 
letteroffice/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2007) (stating the caging total to date was 1771 
and attaching a spreadsheet of the caging list). 
 9. GREG PALAST, ARMED MADHOUSE:  FROM BAGHDAD TO NEW ORLEANS—
SORDID SECRETS AND STRANGE TALES OF A WHITE HOUSE GONE WILD (2007). 
 10. Greg Palast, New Florida Vote Scandal Feared, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/3956129.stm. 
 11. See PALAST, supra note 9, at 199–208 (detailing Palast’s account of caging 
efforts in Florida in 2004); see also Palast, supra note 10; Newsnight Report (BBC 
television broadcast Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkvWkwv7 
UVo.  Palast’s trademark hyperbole apparently causes the mainstream media to 
take him with a grain of salt and may partly account for their unwillingness to give 
serious attention to his caging charges.  See, e.g., Greg Palast, Editorial, Media as 
Lapdog, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A33 (condemning U.S. mainstream media 
culture for allowing the story of voter challenges of African Americans in the 2004 
election to slip through the cracks). “The truth is, I knew a story like this one 
would never be reported in my own country.  Because investigative reporting . . . is 
dying.”  Id. 
 12. Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Senators Demand DOJ 
Investigation into Voter Suppression Allegations (June 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=277168. 
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additional light on the subject.13  Thus, it is impossible at this 
writing to determine the precise facts behind Griffin’s “caging” 
memos.14  After Goodling’s testimony, the mainstream press has 
generally ignored the story, relegating it primarily to the 
blogosphere and on-line venues.15
II. VOTE CAGING: A DEFINITION 
At this juncture, the primary value of the controversy has been 
to raise troubling questions about vote caging—or “voter caging,” 
an equivalent term—as it has been practiced and may be practiced 
in the future.  The purpose of this article is to define it, point to 
phenomena that often accompany it, and shed light on its history 
by rehearsing a noteworthy account of it that occurred more than 
fifty years ago and may have served as a model for its subsequent 
use. 
The term “vote caging” (or “caging”) as referring to a process 
leading to voter challenges is of recent vintage.  No major 
dictionary or political science reference work mentions them, nor 
does a leading legal casebook published as recently as 2007.16  The 
 13. Greg Gordon, Bush Invokes Executive Privilege for Rove in Attorney Firings, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/ 
story/18637.html. 
 14. See generally id. (stating that the decision throws a roadblock in the way of 
the investigation). 
 15. See Dahlia Lithwick, Raging Caging: What the Heck is Vote Caging, and Why 
Should We Care?, SLATE, May 31, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2167284/page 
num/all/#page_start; see also Greg Gordon, ‘Vote Caging’ Allegations Arise in Probe of 
U.S. Attorney Firings, SACRAMENTO BEE (Cal.), June 25, 2007, at A7; PBS Now: Voter 
Caging & Housing Works (PBS television broadcast July 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/330/index.html. 
 16. “Vote caging” or “caging” as a reference to voter challenges does not 
appear in WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) or in MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).  No general or political 
science dictionary published as late as 2004 of which we are aware contains an 
entry for the terms.  See, e.g., ALAN ABRAMOWITZ, VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: ELECTIONS 
AND VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); FRANK BEASLEY, THE BLACKWELL 
DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1999); PHILIP JOHN DAVIES, US ELECTIONS TODAY 
(2d ed. 1999); JOHN L. MOORE, ELECTIONS A TO Z (1999); THE REFERENCE SHELF: 
THE U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM (Paul McCaffrey ed., 2004).  Nor does a scholarly 
overview of vote suppression techniques in the United States published in 2006 
mention the terms.  See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW 
POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006).  A brief overview of the same subject by a 
non-profit organization the same year also does not mention the terms.  See 
PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, THE NEW FACE OF JIM CROW: VOTER SUPPRESSION IN 
AMERICA (2006), available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid 
=29392222.  Nor do the terms appear in the index of the 2007 edition of a leading 
4
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on-line Double-Tongued Dictionary, however, which describes itself as 
“a lexicon of fringe English, focusing on slang, jargon, and new 
words,” has an entry for “caging: n. the processing of responses to a 
fund-raising or marketing campaign, especially when concerning 
money.”17
Apparently, the etymology of the term is based on the 
numerous cubbyholes or “cages” where mail used to be sorted by 
postal workers called “cagers.”18  The Double-Tongued Dictionary’s 
examples of usage go back to 1981, but only one concerns vote 
caging, a quote from Greg Palast in the November 2, 2004 Baltimore 
Chronicle: “The GOP’s announced plan to block 35,000 voters in 
Ohio ran up against the wrath of federal judges; so, in Florida, what 
appear to be similar plans had been kept under wraps until the 
discovery of documents called ‘caging’ lists.”19
Due to the prominence of the U.S. attorney firings scandal, 
the term “caging,” connoting voter-suppression, can be found in 
Wikipedia.20  In addition, various blogs, publications by non-profit 
organizations, and on-line news sources provide definitions as well 
as examples.21
For purposes of this essay, vote caging is defined as a three-
stage process designed to identify persons in another party or 
faction whose names are on a voter registration list, but whose legal 
election law casebook.  SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007). 
 17. Double-Tongued Dictionary, http://www.doubletongued.org/index. 
php/dictionarycitations/caging/(last visited Dec. 30, 2007). 
 18. Paul Kiel, Cage Match: Did Griffin Try to Disenfranchise African-American 
Voters in 2004?, TPM MUCKRAKER, June 26, 2007, http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/ 
archives/003523.php. 
 19. Double-Tongued Dictionary, supra note 17. 
 20. See Caging, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caging_list (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2007). 
 21. See, e.g., Posting of J. Gerald Herbert to Campaign Legal Center, Inside 
the Vote Cage: Griffin, Goodling, and McNulty (No, Not Another Law Firm), 
http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-138.html (June 20, 2007); Posting of J. Gerald 
Hebert & Brian Dupre to Campaign Legal Center Blog, Vote Caging and the 
Attorney General, http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-152.html (July 23, 2007); 
Teresa James, Caging Democracy: A 50-Year History of Partisan Challenges to Minority 
Voters, Project Vote (Sept. 2007), available at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ 
ProjectVote/Publications/Caging_Democracy_Report.pdf; Whitehouse, supra 
note 12; Justin Levitt & Andrew Allison, A Guide to Voter Caging, Brennan Center 
for Justice (June 2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/sub 
pages/download_file_49608.pdf; Justin Levitt & Andrew Allison, Reported Instances 
of Vote Caging, Brennan Center for Justice (June 2007), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_49609.pdf. 
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qualification to vote is dubious, and then to challenge their 
qualification either before or on Election Day.  Ostensibly, caging is 
an attempt to prevent voter fraud.  In practice, it may have the 
effect of disenfranchising voters who are legitimately registered. 
In the first stage, political operatives typically identify a 
geographic area with a disproportionate number of registered 
voters who belong to a different party from that of the operatives. 
In the second stage, the operatives send first-class, do-not-
forward letters (sometimes by registered mail)22 to people in the 
identified areas, sometimes asking them to perform a simple task 
that includes responding by mail to the original letter.  All letters 
returned to the senders unopened are assumed to indicate the 
addressees no longer live at the address that appears on the 
registration rolls, and therefore may not be legally entitled to vote.  
Their names are then put on a “caging list.” 
In the third stage, political operatives allied with those who 
constructed the caging list may appear on Election Day at the 
polling places where those people whose letters were returned 
unopened may try to vote.  The votes are then challenged, either by 
the partisan operatives or by election officials who have been 
supplied with their names by the operatives, depending on the 
state’s laws. 
If the challenged voter had moved out of the precinct she tried 
to vote in, she would—in many cases—be unable to vote there, as 
well as in the precinct she actually inhabited, without having re-
registered, although she might still be able to cast a provisional 
ballot.  Moreover, the challenge process takes time.  If there is a 
long line of voters, multiple challenges—whether successful or 
not—can slow the voting process and discourage legitimate voters 
waiting in line from voting.  For the most part, the challenged 
voters would presumably tend to vote for the party of those whose 
votes were caged, given that the original do-not-forward letters were 
targeted at geographical areas containing a disproportionate 
number of registrants from the opposing party. 
In addition, if some of the voters waiting in line and observing 
the challengers suddenly had doubts about their own voter 
qualifications—justified or otherwise—they too might drop out of 
the line.  While it is not a necessary aspect of caging, operatives 
representing the cagers sometimes encourage this eventuality by 
 22. See Levitt & Allison, A Guide to Voter Caging, supra note 21, at ¶ 3. 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/4
DAVIDSON - ADC 1/31/2008  11:00:49 AM 
2008] VOTE CAGING 539 
 
distributing handbills, putting up signs, making phone calls, or 
placing radio ads that contain false information about voter 
qualifications and stress dire legal consequences of breaking the 
law.  For example, the following sign was put up in a Democratic 
precinct on or near Election Day 2002 in Baltimore:  “COME OUT 
TO VOTE ON NOVEMBER 6th.  BEFORE YOU COME TO VOTE 
MAKE SURE YOU PAY YOUR: PARKING TICKETS, MOTOR 
VEHICLE TICKETS, OVERDUE RENT, AND MOST IMPORTANT 
ANY WARRANTS.”23
Of course, none of the items mentioned in the sign were 
required to be paid or quashed in order to vote.  Moreover, 
election day that year was the fifth of November, not the sixth.  
Another tactic with the same intimidating purpose is to station at 
the polling place off-duty police officers or people in official-
seeming uniforms, sometimes carrying side arms.24  A bill 
introduced by Senator Barack Obama, called the Deceptive 
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, is currently being 
considered in Congress.25  The Act would make such tactics a 
crime.26
The hope of discouraging potential voters with these 
techniques is premised on the assumption that a disproportionate 
number of people in the targeted precincts will be uneducated, 
unsure of their voting rights, unreasonably fearful they might break 
an election law, unable to take the time necessary to establish that 
 23. Anne-Marie Cusac, Bullies at the Voting Booth, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 2004, 
available at http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0917-09.htm.  This article 
also provides interesting examples of voting information, containing the wrong 
date, being handed out in predominantly Democratic districts.  Id. 
 24. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, TANYA DUNLAP, GALE KENNY, & BENJAMIN WISE, 
REPUBLICAN BALLOT SECURITY PROGRAMS: VOTE PROTECTION OR MINORITY VOTE 
SUPPRESSION—OR BOTH? 50 (2004), available at http://www.votelaw.com/blog/ 
blogdocs/GOP_Ballot_Security_Programs.pdf  [hereinafter DAVIDSON ET AL.] 
(discussing the RNC-directed New Jersey Ballot Security Program in 1981).  
Similar events in 1988 occurred on the opposite coast in Orange County, 
California.  Id. at 68. 
 25. Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, S. 453, 110th 
Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db 
name=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s453rs.txt.pdf; see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, 
Election Fraud and the Initiative Process: A Study of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights 
Initiative, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 933 n.243 (2007); Matthew Hay Brown, Senate 
Bill Outlaws Campaign Trickery; Cardin Backs Curb on Bogus Endorsements, BALTIMORE 
SUN (Md.), Feb. 1, 2007, at 5B. 
 26. Id. 
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they are legally registered, or are indeed unqualified to vote.27  If 
many do-not-forward letters have been returned, at least some of 
those on the registration rolls are probably unqualified to vote, 
which gives some credence to the cagers’ claim that their sole 
concern is detecting and preventing fraud instead of discouraging 
legal voters from voting.  For, at its core, caging can only gain favor 
in the court of public opinion if it is successfully portrayed as an 
anti-fraud measure, not a partisan vote-suppression technique. 
Even if vote caging were used solely to prevent illegal voting in 
the populace at large, there are serious problems with the method 
as we have described it.  For example, to the extent that party 
operatives target only members of another party, it is clear that 
fraud prevention is not the sole or even primary purpose of the 
caging operation.  The subtext is that only fraud in the opposing 
party is worth exposing, to diminish its power, while the cagers’ 
party’s potential illegal voters are ignored. 
In addition, there are several reasons why a “Do Not Forward” 
letter can be returned to the sender.  First, the letter might have 
mistakenly been delivered to the wrong address or not delivered at 
all.  Voting rights lawyer Dayna Cunningham has marshaled 
evidence to raise serious questions about the fairness of challenges 
or purges based on address verification.28  Among the most 
important of these is poor mail delivery in low-income areas.29  Both 
Internal Revenue Service and census data “suggest that a major 
contributor to low response rates in minority communities may be 
ineffective mail delivery.”30
Second, “partisan activists can make mistakes—unintentional 
or otherwise—in matching the names on the returned letters with 
the names on the registration lists they are using” (i.e., mistaking 
“Jameson” for “Jamison”).31  In addition, two or more people with 
exactly the same name can be confused with each other.32
Third, if the letter is registered, the intended recipient may 
actually have lived at the address, but was not home to sign for the 
letter when it was delivered.  For example, in his book, Palast 
 27. See generally Cusac, supra note 23 (discussing attempts to confuse or 
frighten voters). 
 28. See generally Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to be the Electors? A Reflection on 
the History of Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370 (1991). 
 29. Id. at 393–94. 
 30. Id. 
 31. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 18. 
 32. See id. at 18. 
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claimed that some of the targeted recipients of caging mail in 
Jacksonville in 2004 were actually serving abroad in the Armed 
Services.33
Finally, the registration list the cagers worked with might have 
been out of date or inaccurate.34
In spite of these important sources of error, once a voter’s 
name is on the cagers’ list, he is the target of a challenge, even if 
qualified to vote.35  Then, “[e]ach [person] confronted by a 
challenge slows down the line.”36  Whether voters persevere or give 
up depends on how confident they are, how knowledgeable about 
the voting process, and how aggressive the challenger.37  But even if 
voters persevere, they may be required to cast a provisional ballot 
until the status of their registration is established.38  Unfortunately, 
not all such ballots are counted.39  A survey of provisional ballots 
nationwide in 2004 found that only sixty-eight percent of the 1.6 
million ballots cast were counted.40
From this description of the process of vote caging, one can 
see that it works best as a means of suppressing votes when the 
population targeted is relatively uneducated, particularly about 
election laws.  Vote caging in a wealthy, highly educated 
neighborhood would be unlikely to net a sizable percentage of 
returned unopened letters.  The chances that letters returned in 
such a neighborhood were indicative of people who had either 
moved and were likely to try to vote in their old precinct, or who 
were disqualified from voting for some other reason, are small 
when compared to poor neighborhoods.  The logic of the process 
thus recommends that it be used primarily in the latter areas.  
Moreover, when low-income, low-education precincts also happen 
to be largely populated by African-Americans, the voters will usually 
be Democrats.41  While not as Democratic as blacks, Latinos in poor 
 33. PALAST, supra note 9, at 204. 
 34. Cunningham, supra note 28, at 387–88, 403. 
 35. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 18. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See SOLUTION OR PROBLEM?  PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN 2004 1, 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ERIP10Apr05.pdf 
(discussing provisional voting status). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 5. 
 41. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 13–14; RICHARD J. ELLIS ET AL., THE 
ELECTIONS OF 2000, 64–65 tbl. 3-1 (2001) (showing that ninety percent of voting 
African Americans voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2000, and 
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neighborhoods—except for anomalies such as Cuban-Americans—
also present a logical target for vote caging.42
Students at predominantly black colleges are more likely to be 
Democrats and, therefore, another target.43  While not poorly 
educated, they are not yet experienced voters; they are probably 
not as well-versed in the basics of registration requirements and 
procedure.  Accordingly, they are vulnerable to the kinds of 
misinformation mentioned above.  Moreover, if do-not-forward 
letters are sent to their campus addresses during summer vacation, 
the chances they will receive them are diminished.44
Thus, while caging is a technique that could be employed by 
partisans of any party, its logic suggests that it is primarily employed 
by Republicans against Democrats, especially those in areas with 
heavily African-American and Latino concentrations.  Moreover, 
there is evidence that this technique has been in use for many 
years, regardless of the fact that targeting race in caging may be 
illegal under the Voting Rights Act.45
showing a link between a lower income and a Democratic or Independent vote); 
id. at 68 (discussing a strong correlation between voter’s income and culture and 
their choice of candidate). 
 42. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 13–14.  See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note 
42, at 64–65 tbl. 3-1 (showing that sixty-two percent of Latino voters chose the 
Democratic presidential candidate in 2000).  Compare Jeffrey Gettleman, On 
Politics; A Cuban Revolution, Only It’s in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at 14NJ 
(stating that Cuban-American voters in New Jersey are primarily Democrats), with 
Christopher Marquis, It’s Republican vs. Republican on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
2002, at 18 (stating that Cuban-American voters have been a core constituency for 
Republican candidates in Florida). 
 43. While some predominantly black colleges have long been targets of vote 
suppression, students at other colleges may also become victims of both 
Democratic and Republican efforts.  See ELLEN KOLASKY & LORA WONDOLOWSKI, 
LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, NOT HOME, NOT WELCOME: 
BARRIERS TO STUDENT VOTERS (2004), available at http://www.lcveducation.org/ 
programs/polling-research/LCVEF_PD-Barriers-to-Student-Voting_2004-Rpt.pdf.  
For examples of historically black colleges as targets of vote suppression, see 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982-2005, 65–66 (2006), available at 
http://www.votingrightsact.org/report/finalreport.pdf. 
 44. The director of the counseling center at historically black Edward Waters 
College in Jacksonville commented on the small likelihood that students at his 
college would have received the caging letters they were sent by Republicans 
during the summer vacation of 2004.  PBS Now: Voter Caging & Housing Works, 
supra note 15. 
 45. See The Voting Rights Act § 10(b), 42 U.S.C. 1973i (2006). 
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III. ARIZONA PRECURSORS TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VOTE CAGING 
One widely discussed example of the caging described above 
occurred in Arizona in the late 1950s and early 1960s.46  It received 
wide publicity when William H. Rehnquist was nominated to the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1971 and to the office of Chief Justice in 
1986.47  The following is an account of the Arizona ballot security 
program Rehnquist participated in, a component of which involved 
vote caging, and the challenges and harassment of African-
American and Latino voters in Phoenix.48  The story not only sheds 
light on racially discriminatory caging, it also indicates the longevity 
of the procedure.  Moreover, it demonstrates that caging is not 
necessarily conducted by shady individuals or organizations.  
Sometimes, as in Phoenix, respected members of the community, 
in their capacity as party leaders, are responsible for caging.49
The account of Justice Rehnquist’s confirmation hearings and 
the famous controversy over his participation in vote caging 
activities might, at first reading, seem to play an inordinate role in 
the present analysis of vote caging.  But it is largely because of the 
Senate hearings on his nominations in 1971 and 1986 that the logic 
of vote caging and its abuses as a ballot security technique are so 
well documented.  It is also worth noting that Rehnquist’s possible 
participation—while a major element in the hearings’ drama—is 
not germane to the larger issue of whether racially discriminatory 
vote caging efforts by the Phoenix Republican Party occurred, and 
if so, how they worked.  The evidence is clear that some of those 
efforts were racially targeted and involved threats and intimidation 
in minority precincts. 
GOP ballot security programs gained national attention in the 
fall of 1971, after President Richard Nixon nominated William 
 46. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 17–21.  Other cities were also the 
source of much debate regarding voter fraud and voter challenging strategies.  See 
id. at 33–38 (citing instances in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Houston among 
others). 
 47. Id. at 19–21 (describing controversy around Rehnquist’s nomination to 
the Supreme Court); id. at 21–24 (describing even greater debate surrounding his 
nomination to Chief Justice). 
 48. Id. at 15–24. 
 49. For example, Rehnquist, a future Supreme Court Chief Justice and 
prominent Phoenix attorney, who was serving as co-chairman of the GOP ballot 
security program in 1960, had a role in training challengers using some of these 
questionable tactics.  See id. at 21–24. 
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Rehnquist to the U.S. Supreme Court.50  The nomination surprised 
observers.  Nixon and his staff had kept their consideration of 
Rehnquist quiet; Nixon, in fact, had decided on him only the day 
before the public announcement.51  The president’s hesitation and 
secrecy resulted from previous confirmation battles.52  In 1969, 
opposition to Nixon’s Supreme Court nominees, conservative 
southerners Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell, forced 
the president to withdraw their names.53  A weary Senate later 
confirmed Harry Blackmun and Warren Burger.54  In 1971, few 
senators opposed Nixon’s nomination of Lewis Powell, but public 
concern about Rehnquist’s stance on civil rights arose soon after 
the surprise announcement.55  Opponents believed he had worked 
against the civil rights of minority voters, and part of the evidence 
they offered was information about his involvement in the Arizona 
Republican Party and GOP ballot security programs.56
Rehnquist became active in the Arizona Republican Party after 
completing his clerkship for Supreme Court Justice Robert H. 
Jackson in June 1953.57  It was an exciting time to join the Arizona 
 50. See id. at 19–21 (describing how the 1971 hearings, by challenging 
Rehnquist and his debatable civil rights record, became a catalyst for exploring 
tactics used in ballot security programs). 
 51. Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan fell ill and left two vacancies on the 
court in September 1971.  JOHN DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT  31–34 (2001).  
Nixon wanted a southerner, a conservative, and a relatively young candidate.  Id. at 
31–59.  After considering several candidates, he finally settled on Lewis Powell and 
Rehnquist.  Id. at 241–64. The latter had been responsible for vetting the 
candidates in the Department of Justice until his name was taken seriously into 
consideration.  See id. for detailed information on the nominating process. 
 52. DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST 3–5 (1987); 
DEAN, supra note 51, at 14–29. 
 53. DEAN, supra note 51, at 14–23. 
 54. Dean argues that Nixon intended to significantly reshape the court when 
he became president, even intimidating Supreme Court justices to try to secure 
their resignations.  Id. at 1–9. 
 55. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 19–21 (a number of scholars and 
civil rights activists weighed in during the hearings); DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL 
INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE 
RELATIONS 6–7 (1991) (explaining that despite his reputation and qualifications, 
Rehnquist’s record rejecting various anti-discrimination measures became a 
source of concern). 
 56. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 19–21. 
 57. William Hubbs Rehnquist was born on October 1, 1924 in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.  DAVIS, supra note 55, at 3–6.  He graduated Phi Beta Kappa with a 
degree in political science from Stanford in 1948.  Id.  He later earned an M.A. in 
political science from Stanford and an M.A. in government from Harvard.  Id.  In 
1952 he graduated from Stanford Law School and then clerked for Justice Jackson 
12
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GOP.  The state became a Democratic stronghold in the 1930s, 
with the number of Republican registered voters declining to an 
all-time low of twelve percent by 1940.58  The narrow victories of 
Republicans Barry Goldwater to the U.S. Senate and John Rhodes 
to the U.S. House of Representatives (the first Arizona Republican 
ever elected to the House) in 1952 revived the state’s competitive 
two-party system.59  Particularly noteworthy was the fact that 
Goldwater defeated Ernest McFarland, the Democratic majority 
leader of the Senate.60  Republicans also made sharp inroads in the 
state legislature that year, and the GOP suddenly became a strong 
force in Arizona.61  Goldwater won a landslide victory in 1958, 
although Arizona’s black precincts voted heavily against him.62  He 
won this election, in part, with the help of volunteers like 
Rehnquist: bright, aspiring white professionals who wanted to build 
a national Republican party reflecting their conservative values.63
Several factors aided the Republicans.  Conservative 
newcomers from other states, hardworking volunteers, a pro-GOP 
press, and popular candidates like Barry Goldwater, contributed to 
their success.64  They also benefited from a split in the Democratic 
Party between liberal activists, many of whom had moved to 
Arizona after 1945, and the so-called Pinto Democrats, traditional 
for eighteen months.  Id.  In 1953 Rehnquist moved to Phoenix where he 
practiced law with four different firms until he moved to Washington, D.C. in 1969 
to work as Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department 
of Justice.  Id.  Richard Kleindienst recommended Rehnquist to head the Office of 
Legal Counsel after he took the number two position in the Justice Department 
(Rehnquist had become a trusted friend and adviser to then-Arizona state party 
chairman Kleindienst in the 1950s).  Id.  In 1971 Rehnquist was forty-seven years 
old.  Id.  On Rehnquist’s relationship with Kleindienst, see DAVID G. SAVAGE, 
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 39 (1993); BOLES, 
supra note 52, at 17. 
 58. Republican voter registration dropped from thirty-three percent of the 
total in 1928 to just twelve percent in 1940. DAVID R. BERMAN, ARIZONA POLITICS 
AND GOVERNMENT: THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT 48–
51 (1998). Between 1933 and 1951, the GOP did not elect a single representative 
to the Arizona senate.  Id.  In the Arizona house during those same years, 
“Republican representation reached a high of eleven out of seventy-two seats.”  Id. 
at 48. 
 59. Id. at 51–56. 
 60. ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG, BARRY GOLDWATER 131–32 (1995). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 132. 
 63. Id. at 127. 
 64. See id. at 125–32. 
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conservatives who were alienated by the national Democratic 
Party’s increasing support for black civil rights.65
Nonetheless, while Republicans made steady progress after 
1952, electoral contests in the state remained highly competitive.66  
In this context, African-Americans and Latinos played an important 
role.  Both groups were desperately poor.67  Their situation—as 
measured by the degree of residential and school segregation, 
exclusion from public accommodations by an informal Jim Crow 
system, and, in most respects, exclusion as well from the local 
political system—was not so different from that of African 
Americans in the South at the time.68  Barry Goldwater’s butler, Otis 
Burns, told an interviewer many years later that the city “wasn’t any 
better than a southern town.”69
 In 1960, African Americans made up 4.8 percent of Phoenix’s 
residents, having declined from 6.5 percent in 1940.70  Residents 
with Hispanic surnames, while growing in numbers along with the 
general population, composed only 8.2 percent in 1960.71  For 
various reasons, including their low socio-economic status and their 
younger average age, these two groups composed a much smaller 
 65. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 52–53, 63–64.  According to Berman, many 
conservative Democrats retained their registration in the Democratic Party to 
influence politics in their counties but often voted for Republicans.  Id.  “Pinto” is 
Spanish for a horse of two colors.  See id. at 53. 
 66. Republican gains increased faster in the 1966 election because that year a 
federal court instituted a new population-based apportionment system for the 
Arizona senate and house. Id. at 54, 56. The previous geographically based system 
favored farmers, ranchers, and miners. Id. at 54. The new plan gave significant 
weight to the Republican stronghold in Phoenix (Maricopa County).  Id. During 
the postwar years, for the first time in Arizona history, Republicans captured the 
state house and senate.  Id. at 554–56. 
 67. See GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 37–38. 
 68. BRADFORD LUCKINGHAM, PHOENIX: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHWESTERN 
METROPOLIS 171–76 (1989).  See also Mary Melcher, Blacks and Whites Together: 
Interracial Leadership in the Phoenix Civil Rights Movement, J. ARIZ. HIST. 32, 196–211 
(Summer 1991).  See generally Interview by Mary Melcher with the Rev. George B. 
Brooks (Jan. 24, 1990) (on file with the Ariz. Historical Found., Hayden Library at 
Ariz. State Univ.) (describing a first-hand account of these kinds of challenges 
faced by African-Americans). 
 69. GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 88; see also id. at 37–38, 88–89. 
 70. LUCKINGHAM, supra note 68, at 175. 
 71. Leonard E. Goodall, Phoenix: Reformers at Work, in URBAN POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTHWEST 111 (Leonard E. Goodall ed., 1967).  But see LUCKINGHAM, supra note 
68, at 171 (stating that Hispanics made up fourteen percent of the population in 
Phoenix in 1960). 
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percentage of the city’s actual voters—probably less than ten 
percent combined.72
Still, in spite of these groups’ small proportion of the 
electorate, Republicans took them seriously—not as groups to be 
won over, but as ones that could frustrate Republican goals, 
particularly when elections were tight.73  Historical memory also 
came into play.  Democrats, after all, had taken over the state in the 
1930s with the support of new voters and Latinos.74  African-
Americans had also demonstrated they were not Goldwater fans.75  
The ballot security measures made famous by the Rehnquist 
hearings can best be understood in this context. 
The Republicans were especially blessed at this time with a 
perfect rationale for focusing on minority, low-income precincts 
that happened to vote Democratic: a state law requiring voters be 
literate in English.76  The law was enacted shortly after achieving 
statehood, as one historian described it, “to limit ‘the ignorant 
Mexican vote’ . . . .”  As recently as the 1960s, registrars applied the 
test to reduce the ability of blacks, Indians, and Hispanics to 
register to vote.”77  Arizona shared this racial barrier to voting with 
several of the states of the Old South, a barrier there since the end 
of Reconstruction.78  The use of the literacy test continued without 
interruption until prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.79  
 72. GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 37–38.  While black and Hispanic residents 
contributed to a substantial minority of the population, “[o]f the twenty-nine 
precincts in Phoenix, fourteen contained no blacks and seven more contained 
fewer than ten black residents each.”  Id. at 37.  Both de facto and de jure 
segregation and discrimination resulted in limited or even “no influence on 
community decision-making.”  Id. at 38; see also BERMAN, supra note 58, at 78–80 
(describing Arizona’s “participation problem” related to age, non-citizen status, 
and racial exclusion). 
 73. See Berman, supra note 58, at 64–65, 74–80 (describing the relationship 
between minority voters and the political parties in Arizona). 
 74. Id. at 48–49. 
 75. GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 132. 
 76. “[M]inority mobilization has tended to benefit Democrats.”  BERMAN, 
supra note 58, at 64.  Republicans could use the law to challenge voters in 
primarily Democratic precincts, which also happened to have minorities. 
 77. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 75. 
 78. Phoenix was comparable to the South with regard to discrimination.  See 
GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 88; BERMAN, supra note 58, at 76–77 (stating that 
Arizona and Alaska were the only non-southern states that had to comply with the 
pre-clearance components of the Voting Rights Act, which required federal 
approval of legal changes affecting voting rights, such as changing district 
boundaries). 
 79. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 76. 
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The Arizona legislature did not officially repeal the test, however, 
until 1972: the year Rehnquist became a member of the Supreme 
Court.80  But during the Republican ascendancy in Arizona, the 
literacy test was a key tool with which to challenge minority voters.81  
As Arizona political historian David Berman describes it: “Anglos 
sometimes challenged minorities at the polls and asked them to 
read and explain ‘literacy’ cards.  Intimidators hoped to discourage 
minorities from standing in line to vote.”82
The literacy test was not integral to vote caging.83  Nonetheless, 
the caging incidents described in the Rehnquist nomination 
hearings were employed in tandem with the tests, just as caging has 
subsequently been used in conjunction with other forms of 
suppression techniques. 
A. Challenging Voters in Phoenix Minority Precincts 
Experiments with ballot security in Phoenix began at least as 
early as 1954, but the first large-scale ballot security drive took place 
in 1958, when the Arizona Republican Party sent volunteers and 
party leaders to ninety percent of Maricopa County’s 220 polling 
places to turn out the Republican vote and challenge Democratic 
voters’ qualifications.84  The first basis for challenge was residency.85  
Republicans mailed campaign literature to 18,000 Democrats 
marked “Do not forward” and “Return postage guaranteed.”86  The 
returned mail was collected to form challenge lists.87  Equipped 
with lists of voters whose current address apparently did not 
 80. Id.  See also Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971) (regarding a challenge to 
Arizona’s state legislative districting laws); Apache County v. United States, 256 F. 
Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966) (upholding reinstatement of literacy testing, 
distinguished from those barred by the Voting Rights Act, as a prerequisite to 
voter registration); Venita Hawthorne James, Arizona’s Legacy of Prejudice, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Jan. 12, 1991, at A2.  For more on the relationship between minority 
voters and the political parties, see BERMAN, supra note 58, at 64–65, 74–80. 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
 82. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 76. 
 83. Other voter suppression and intimidation tactics were used in tandem 
with Arizona’s literacy tests, as will become clear below. 
 84. Some GOP Vote Challengers Face Criminal Charges for Holding Posts, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1958, at 4. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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correspond to their address of registration, GOP challengers tried 
to disqualify the Democratic voters if they showed up at the polls.88
The second basis for challenge in 1958 was literacy: challenged 
voters had to be able to read from the U.S. Constitution.89  On 
Election Day, Republicans sent challengers to confront potential 
voters with passages from the Constitution.90  According to 
witnesses, the challengers (described as Anglos) flanked voters 
(described as blacks or Latinos, and often elderly) and asked them 
to read aloud a passage from the Constitution printed on a note 
card.91  If the voter refused or could not read satisfactorily, the 
challengers often asked the person to leave the voting line, 
although the law stipulated that the challenger could not harass or 
intimidate the voter.92  To make matters even more confusing in 
this particular election, contrary to the law, the Maricopa 
Republican county chairman assigned poll-watchers and 
challengers to selected precincts, when only the official precinct 
committee had legal jurisdiction to do so.93
Opponents of these practices argued that the GOP ballot 
security programs attempted to disfranchise qualified minority 
 88. Id.  The pro-GOP paper reported that Democrats were “obviously 
surprised by the Republican program.”  Id.  Some Democrats retaliated in 1960 
with postcards to 349 Republican voters in District 15 warning them of 
“punishment” if they moved and voted in their former precinct.  See Bill King, 
Postcards Threaten GOP Voters, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1960, at 8.  The unspecified 
punishment included the loss of vote and perjury penalties for making false 
affidavits.  Id.  The Democratic list was compiled on the basis of returned mailings 
to registered Republicans.  Id. 
 89. For descriptions of such challenges, see Senate Committee on the Judiciary: 
Hearings on the Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., of Virginia, to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 92nd 
Cong. 295–96 (1971) (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, Director, Washington 
Bureau, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and 
Legislative Chairman, Leadership Conference On Civil Rights) [hereinafter 
Nominations 1971] available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/ 
judiciary/sh92-69-267/browse.html (describing challengers using the Arizona 
State Constitution).  See, e.g., Gene McLain, Fight Erupts At South Side Precinct, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 1962, at 11 (stating that under Arizona law, it was legal to use 
the U.S. Constitution to challenge voters). 
 90. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 295–96. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  See Melcher, Blacks and Whites Together, supra note 68, at 208–09.  See, 
e.g., Interview by Mary Melcher with Rev. George B. Brooks (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file 
with the Ariz. Historical Found., Hayden Library at Ariz. State. Univ.) 
(documenting first-hand account of challenges at the voting precinct). 
 93. Some GOP Vote Challengers Face Criminal Charges For Holding Posts, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1958, at 4. 
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voters.94  Richard G. Kleindienst, Arizona GOP chairman in the late 
1950s and attorney general under President Nixon, later denied 
those claims, saying that Republicans “challenge in precincts where 
it has been demonstrated in the past that some parts of the 
Democratic organization in Maricopa County try to crowd into the 
polls at the last minute people who are not qualified to vote.”95  But 
The Arizona Republic only mentioned south side minority precincts 
as the ones in which Republican challengers were active that year.96  
County Democratic chairman Vince Maggiore claimed that some of 
the challengers were arrogating authority reserved for precinct 
election officials.97  “There should be no place in Arizona for 
deliberate attempts to impede the voting of groups which have 
fought so hard for their rights,” he said.98  Other Democrats 
claimed some Republican challengers were asking voters to read 
sections of the Constitution “containing a lot of big and difficult 
words.”99
B. Events at a Polling Place in 1962: The 1971 Hearings 
Rehnquist’s involvement in these disputed ballot security 
programs came to light near the end of the 1971 Judiciary 
Committee hearings when five witnesses sent sworn affidavits 
accusing him of challenging and harassing voters with literacy tests 
in the predominantly black Bethune precinct in 1964.100  They seem 
 94. See Melcher, Blacks and Whites Together, supra note 68, at 208–09. 
 95. McLain, supra note 89, at 11. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  The fight here involved Republican challenger Wayne Bentson and 
Democratic Party representative Pat Marino.  Id. at 1.  Several witnesses in 
Rehnquist’s 1971 confirmation hearings apparently confused Rehnquist with 
Bentson.  Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 290.  Poll-watchers were active in 
seven minority South Side precincts plus Sky Harbor, Parkview, and Okemah.  
McLain, supra note 89, at 11.  The 1962 Phoenix ballot security campaign also 
included turning out the Republican vote.  Election Puzzles Experts, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Nov. 8, 1962, at 11.  In this non-presidential election, more than seventy percent of 
registered voters made the trip to the polls.  Id.  The Arizona Republic credited the 
turnout to Republican organization.  Id. 
 100. GOP ballot security programs were not the only reason for opposition to 
Rehnquist.  After his 1971 nomination, a memo came to light which Rehnquist 
wrote during his clerkship for Justice Robert Jackson in support of the 1896 Plessy 
v. Ferguson decision upholding the segregationist doctrine of “separate but equal.”  
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (2000).  
Rehnquist claimed that the views were those of Jackson, not his—a contention 
strongly denied by Jackson’s long-time secretary, who called Rehnquist’s account 
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to have confused Rehnquist with Wayne Bentson, a Republican 
who challenged voters to read from his note card at the Bethune 
precinct in 1962 and was involved in a scuffle with a Democratic 
Party representative that year.101  But accurate information that 
Rehnquist had trained GOP challengers prevented the Senate from 
ignoring the charges.102  The evidence included an FBI 
investigation of voting interference in Arizona in the 1960s;103 
relevant testimony from Clarence Mitchell, director of the NAACP 
Washington Bureau and legislative chairman for the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights;104 and a letter from Superior Court 
Judge Charles L. Hardy explaining in general terms how some of 
the state’s voters were intimidated in 1962.105  Judge Hardy’s letter 
shed a harsh light on the GOP ballot security activities: 
In each precinct [with overwhelmingly Democratic 
registrants] every black or Mexican person was being 
challenged [that he or she was unable to read the 
Constitution of the United States in the English language] 
and it was quite clear that this type of challenging was a 
deliberate effort to slow down the voting so as to cause 
people awaiting their turn to vote to grow tired of waiting 
and leave without voting.  In addition, there was a well 
organized campaign of outright harassment and 
intimidation to discourage persons from attempting to 
“incredible on its face” and added that Rehnquist has “smeared the reputation of a 
great justice.”  Id. at 5.  Other issues that opponents raised included Rehnquist’s 
opposition to a public accommodations ordinance in Phoenix in 1964, to a civil 
rights march in Arizona during the spring of 1964, and to desegregation in 
Arizona high schools in 1967.  Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 290.  Opponents 
also questioned his opposition to the publication of the Pentagon papers and his 
support for government powers of surveillance.  Id. at 289–361, 483–92.  See 
generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 765–82 (1975) (arguing 
the re-emergence of separate-but-equal jurisprudence after Rehnquist became 
Chief Justice by detailing the Court’s handling of desegregation cases). 
 101. McLain, supra note 89, at 11. 
 102. The five witnesses were Democratic poll-watchers Robert Tate and Jordan 
Harris, the Rev. George B. Brooks, and the Rev. and Mrs. Snelson W. McGriff.  
Fred P. Graham, 2 Negroes From Phoenix, Ariz., Say Rehnquist Harassed Blacks at Polls 
in 1964, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1971, at 32; Donald Janson, Rights Aide Calls Rehnquist 
Racist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1971, at 46.  For the information on Wayne Bentson, see 
McLain, supra note 89, at 1, 11.  Rehnquist denied ever being in the Bethune 
Precinct on Election Day 1964, which sheds little light on his role in this situation 
since the event took place in 1962.  Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 492. 
 103. Id. at 297. 
 104. Id. at 295.  For Mitchell’s testimony, see id. at 289–98. 
 105. Id. at 486. 
19
Davidson et al.: Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
DAVIDSON - ADC 1/31/2008  11:00:49 AM 
552 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
vote.  In the black and brown areas, handbills were 
distributed warning persons that if they were not properly 
qualified to vote they would be prosecuted.  There were 
squads of people taking photographs of voters standing in 
line waiting to vote and asking for their names[.]  There is 
no doubt in my mind that these tactics of harassment, 
intimidation and indiscriminate challenging were highly 
improper and violative of the spirit of free elections.106
 These factors prompted the Senate to submit written questions 
to Rehnquist concerning his involvement in elections from 1958 to 
1968.107  Rehnquist was asked if he had ever personally challenged 
voters, or if he had trained or counseled poll-watchers or 
challengers.108  He was also asked if he had ever prepared, selected, 
or advised on the use of printed passages from the Constitution for 
literacy challenges.109  In addition, he was asked when such 
practices came to his attention and if he thought the practices 
lawful or took action to curb them.110  Rehnquist responded: “In 
none of these years did I personally engage in challenging the 
qualifications of any voters.”111  He denied recruiting challengers 
but admitted that he had spoken at a challengers’ school to train 
them.112  He also distanced himself from the practice of literacy 
challenges, which he asserted he never prepared, selected, or 
advised.113  “No such practice came to my attention until sometime 
on Election Day, 1962,” Rehnquist claimed.114  “The manner in 
 106. Id. (quoting Letter from Hardy to Mississippi Senator James Eastland, 
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary). 
 107. Id. at 485. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 491. 
 112. Rehnquist recalled speaking at the challengers’ school for the 1960, 1962, 
and perhaps the 1964 elections: 
The purpose of my talk was to advise the various persons who were to act 
as challengers as to what authorization was required in order to enable 
them to be present in a polling place during the time the election was 
being conducted, and also as to the various legal grounds for challenging 
as provided by applicable Arizona law.  My recollection is that I simply 
recited the grounds set forth in the Arizona Revised Statutes as to the 
basis for challenge, the method of making the challenge, and the 
manner in which the challenge was to be decided by the Election Board 
of the precinct in question. 
Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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which I saw this type of challenge being used, when I visited one 
precinct, struck me as amounting to harassment and intimidation, 
and I advised the Republican challenger to stop using these 
tactics.”115
Rehnquist also claimed that when he saw one Republican 
challenger “going down the line and requiring prospective voters 
to read some passage of the Constitution, rather than presenting 
his challenge to the Election Board in an orderly way,” he “advised 
him to stop this practice, and to make any challenges in the 
manner provided by the law.”116  In response to Judge Hardy’s 
description of GOP challengers in 1962 deliberately slowing down 
voting lines and intimidating and harassing voters by 
photographing them and recording their names, Rehnquist 
explained that before 1962 Republican challengers concerned 
themselves with preventing unregistered persons or persons who 
had changed their residence from voting.117  “I did not realize the 
change in emphasis of some of the Republican challengers in 1962 
until sometime during Election Day of that year.  I therefore feel 
that there was no connection between my role and the 
circumstances related by Judge Hardy.”118
Rehnquist’s sworn response forced senators to make a choice.  
They could believe the nominee, who stated he neither intimidated 
and harassed voters nor supported such measures, or they could 
believe his opponents, who linked him to GOP ballot security 
efforts, but could not prove that he had harassed and intimidated 
voters.119  John P. Frank, “a leading constitutional and Supreme 
Court expert in Phoenix,” wrote in the Washington Post that 
Rehnquist “has been an intellectual force for reaction. . . .  He 
honestly doesn’t believe in civil rights and will oppose them.”120  
The American Civil Liberties Union joined the debate, breaking a 
fifty-two year position of never opposing a nominee for public 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 491–92. 
 118. Id. at 492. 
 119. Graham, supra note 102, at 32 (documenting that affidavits from witnesses 
in the 1971 hearings confused Rehnquist with Bentson, and the year 1964 with 
1962). 
 120. BOLES, supra note 52, at 77–78 (quoting a November 1, 1971 Washington 
Post article). 
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office, when it publicly called for the defeat of Rehnquist as “a 
dedicated opponent of individual civil liberties.”121
The national debate on Rehnquist’s resistance to civil rights 
brought attention and controversy to the hearings.122  The senators 
were under pressure to reach a conclusion, because the Court, with 
two vacant seats, had been in session since early October.123  Finally, 
they voted: sixty-eight senators sided with Rehnquist, twenty-six with 
his opponents.124  Lewis Powell’s simultaneous confirmation was 
much more decisive at eighty-nine to one.125
C. Events at a Polling Place in 1962: The 1986 Hearings 
Publicity about ballot security programs in Arizona resurfaced 
in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan nominated Rehnquist for 
Chief Justice.126  Ironically, 1986 was the same year the RNC was 
involved in a major scandal involving efforts to disfranchise African 
Americans in Louisiana using a type of return-mail registration 
verification Arizona Republicans used in the 1950s.127  This time, 
Rehnquist’s opponents were better organized and more credible.128  
During his confirmation hearings, Senator Edward Kennedy of 
Massachusetts charged that Rehnquist “led a Republican Party 
ballot security program designed to disenfranchise minority voters” 
in the early 1960s.129
Kennedy’s charges were in accord with a 1971 New York Times 
article stating that Rehnquist was co-chairman of the GOP ballot 
security program in 1960, trained challengers in 1962 when he was 
chairman of the lawyer’s committee of the Maricopa County 
Republican Party, and was chairman of the ballot security program 
in 1964.130  Kennedy asserted that Rehnquist “held a high and 
 121. Id. at 11 (quoting AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES 8 
(1972)). 
 122. See generally id. at 3–12 (discussing events surrounding Justice Rehnquist's 
nomination). 
 123. Id. at 3. 
 124. DAVIS, supra note 55, at 7. 
 125. Id. 
 126. BOLES, supra note 52, at 86. 
 127. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 60. 
 128. See generally BOLES, supra note 52, at 86–90 (discussing witness testimony 
and referencing documents during confirmation hearings). 
 129. Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States, 132 
CONG. REC. S12378-04 (1986). 
 130. See Fred P. Graham, Rehnquist Role in Election Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 1971, at 37. 
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responsible position in the election day apparatus from at least 
1960 to 1964, a period that saw very substantial harassment and 
intimidation of voters in minority group precincts.”131
New and credible witnesses also testified or submitted sworn 
affidavits about Rehnquist’s roles in ballot security programs.132  
James Brosnahan, in 1962 an assistant U.S. attorney in Arizona, 
later a U.S. attorney, and in 1986 a senior partner at a San 
Francisco law firm with cases before the Supreme Court, provided 
the most credible refutation of Rehnquist’s sworn statements.133  
During the Judiciary Committee hearings, he explained that he 
had not come forward in 1971 because he had not known that 
events in south Phoenix in 1962 were a focus of the hearings.134
Unlike witnesses at the earlier hearings who mistook 
Rehnquist for another challenger, Brosnahan knew Rehnquist 
personally.135  He had attended Phoenix bar association functions 
with him and introduced his wife to him.136  Brosnahan testified 
that he did not see Rehnquist challenge voters.137  But in his official 
capacity as an assistant U.S. attorney, he was called to a polling 
 131. Id.; Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States, 
132 CONG. REC. S12.378-04 (1986).  Rehnquist’s responsibilities, according to 
Kennedy, included the following: In 1960, Rehnquist supervised and assisted in 
the preparation of envelopes mailed to Democrats—largely in African-American 
and Mexican-American districts—which were the foundation of residency 
challenges; he recruited lawyers to serve on a lawyer’s committee; he advised 
challengers on the law; and he supervised in assembling returns of the mailings for 
challenging purposes.  Id.  In 1962, Rehnquist again taught challengers the 
procedures they were to use.  Id.  And, as in 1960, “he served as a troubleshooter, 
going to precincts at which disputes had arisen in order to help resolve them.  In 
1964, Rehnquist had overall responsibility for mailing out envelopes, recruiting 
challengers and members of the lawyer's committee, and speaking, or seeing that 
someone spoke, at a training session of challengers.”  Id.  See also YARBROUGH, supra 
note 100, at 1–11 (discussing a wide array of issues during the 1986 hearings).  For 
more information on other contentious issues during the 1986 hearings see id. 
 132. See generally BOLES, supra note 52, at 86–90 (discussing the testimony of 
four witnesses who had not participated in the 1971 hearings). 
 133. Id. at 86–87. 
 134. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1007–08 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings 1986] (statement of 
James Brosnahan, Attorney, Morrison & Forrester).  He came forward in 1986 
because he received a call ten days prior to his appearance before the committee 
requesting his testimony.  Id. at 996.  He claimed he would have had misgivings if 
he had not come forward.  See id. at 1007. 
 135. Id. at 986. 
 136. Id. at 1012.  For Brosnahan’s entire testimony, see id. at 984–1040. 
 137. Id. at 995–96. 
23
Davidson et al.: Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
DAVIDSON - ADC 1/31/2008  11:00:49 AM 
556 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
place in 1962 in order to investigate claims of harassment.138  “At 
that polling place, I saw William Rehnquist, who was known to me 
as an attorney practicing in the city of Phoenix,” Brosnahan 
testified.139  Rehnquist, he said, was the only challenger present 
when he arrived.140  The atmosphere was very tense; the voters 
waiting in line told him that Rehnquist was challenging, and they 
complained about the aggressiveness of the challenging.141  
Brosnahan talked with Rehnquist, who “did not deny he was a 
challenger.  At that time in 1962, he did not raise any question 
about credentials or any of that.  He did not deny that.”142
Brosnahan further testified that while talking to Rehnquist 
about the complaints against him, Rehnquist’s comments indicated 
that he had been challenging voters.143  Brosnahan stated his views 
on events that occurred in south Phoenix in 1962: “Based on 
interviews with voters, polling officials, and my fellow assistant U.S. 
attorneys, it was my opinion in 1962 that the challenging effort was 
designed to reduce the number of black and Hispanic voters by 
confrontation and intimidation.”144  “The thrust of the effort,” he 
continued later, “was to confront voters, to challenge them, in 
hope that they would be intimidated, that they would not stand in 
line, that they would be fearful that maybe they would be 
embarrassed.”145
Other witnesses corroborated Brosnahan’s testimony that the 
nominee challenged and intimidated minority voters in Phoenix.  
Dr. Sydney Smith, a professor of psychology and former professor 
at Arizona State University, was not certain if it was election day in 
1960 or 1962, but he was certain he heard Rehnquist tell two black 
voters in line, after asking them to read, “You have no business in 
this line trying to vote.  I would ask you to leave.”146  Melvin Mirkin, 
an attorney in Phoenix who supported Rehnquist’s nomination, 
testified that he saw Rehnquist intimidate voters by encouraging 
them to leave the line at a minority polling place and instructing 
 138. Id. at 989. 
 139. Id. at 985. 
 140. Id. at 989. 
 141. Id. at 985. 
 142. Id. at 994. 
 143. Id. at 1008–09, 1011–12, 1038–39.  For descriptions of voters identifying 
Rehnquist as an aggressive challenger, see id. at 1024–26. 
 144. Id. at 989. 
 145. Id. at 1007. 
 146. Id. at 1007–08 (statement of Dr. Sydney Smith).  For Smith’s entire 
testimony, see id. at 1054–65. 
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Republican challengers loudly enough for voters to hear that 
unregistered or illiterate people would not be allowed to vote.147
These charges became a central obstacle to Rehnquist’s 
confirmation as Chief Justice.  He again denied them and claimed 
that his recollection was not good enough to give more detailed 
information.148  When Kennedy asked Rehnquist whether he 
challenged individuals, Rehnquist replied: “I don’t think you—I 
think it was simply watching the vote being counted.”149  Kennedy 
bore in: “Well you’d remember whether you challenged them now, 
Mr. Justice, wouldn’t you.  Did you at any time challenge any 
individual?”150  Rehnquist tried to explain that a challenger was 
authorized by law to go to a polling place most often to watch the 
vote being counted.151  Kennedy then read aloud from Rehnquist’s 
1971 affidavit in which the nominee swore that he did not 
intimidate or harass voters or encourage such behavior in 1964 or 
at any other time from 1958 to 1968.152  “So you might have 
challenged them,” Kennedy queried, “but you didn’t intimidate or 
harass them, I guess is the way I should conclude.”153  Rehnquist 
responded: “Well, I’ve answered all of your questions the best I can, 
I think.”154  Kennedy did not press further for an answer.155
Senators again faced the choice of believing Rehnquist or his 
opponents, only this time they had to decide whether a sitting 
Supreme Court Justice rather than a mere nominee to the Court 
was not truthful.  In making their decision, senators had to sort 
through confusing aspects of Rehnquist’s testimony.156  In 1986, 
Kennedy pressed Rehnquist on his 1971 affidavit in which 
 147. Id. at 1040–48 (statement of Melvin J. Merkin, Attorney); see also Robert 
Lindsey, Rehnquist in Arizona: A Militant Conservative in 60’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
4, 1986, at A7 (generally citing testimony of witnesses who said Rehnquist 
challenged minority voters); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rehnquist Says He Didn’t Deter Voters 
in 60’s, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1986, at A1. 
 148. For an overview of the charges against Rehnquist, see Excerpts from 
Questioning of Rehnquist in the Senate Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1986, at 
A14 [hereinafter Excerpts]. Rehnquist had to refute testimony from several 
witnesses, including Arizona State Senator Manuel Peña. Hearings 1986, supra note 
134, at 1065–78 (statement of Manuel Peña, Sen., State of Arizona). 
 149. Excerpts, supra note 148, at A14. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. 
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Rehnquist wrote: “In none of these years [1958 to 1968] did I 
personally engage in challenging the qualifications of any voters.”157  
This carefully crafted statement apparently did not mean that 
Rehnquist denied ever having been involved in the process of 
challenging voters at the polls.158  It seemed to mean that he did not 
personally confront or question them only during those years.159  
He could have presented a challenge to the election board official 
“in the manner provided by the law,” and the official would have 
personally challenged the voter.160  This, of course, contradicted the 
testimony of Brosnahan and Smith.161  There was also a question of 
chronology.  Rehnquist denied “personally challenging” voters 
between 1958 and 1968, but according to a New York Times article, 
he admitted that he may have personally questioned voters’ literacy 
in 1964.162
Senators also had to decide what defined harassment and 
intimidation in the context of legal literacy challenges to Arizona 
voters before 1964.  Stuart Taylor, Jr., a journalist for The New York 
Times, opined that Rehnquist may not have equated challenging 
with stopping people in line at polling places and asking them to 
demonstrate their qualifications.163  John Dean, former counsel to 
President Nixon, who claims he was the first to suggest Rehnquist 
as a candidate for the court in 1971, believes “that Rehnquist was 
not truthful about his activities in challenging voters.”164  But he 
added, contrary to the testimony of Brosnahan and others, “I don’t 
believe Rehnquist ‘harassed’ black voters ever, for that is not his 
style or nature.  Yet I have no doubt he challenged black voters at a 
time when it was perfectly legal in Arizona to do so.”165  Rehnquist’s 
 157. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 491. 
 158. See Taylor, supra note 147, at A1. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See discussion supra Part III.B.  “[I]n the manner provided by the law” is 
the advice Rehnquist reportedly gave to a Republican challenger whom Rehnquist 
claimed he reprimanded in 1962 for personally questioning voters as they stood in 
line to vote.  Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 491. 
 161. See supra notes 134–147 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Taylor, supra note 147, at A1.   
Justice Rehnquist . . . also said he did not recall approaching any voters in 
those years [1958 to 1968] to question them about their qualifications or 
to ask them to prove their ability to read, as several people have alleged.  
But he said it was possible he had taken such an action in 1964.   
Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. DEAN, supra note 51, at 273. 
 165. Id. 
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careful language and his status as a sitting Supreme Court Justice 
were determinative in the end.  He was confirmed as Chief Justice. 
While the 1986 hearings did not prevent Rehnquist’s elevation 
to Chief Justice, they dramatically brought attention to 
Republicans’ purposeful targeting and intimidation of minority 
voters under the guise of ballot security in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Arizona story illustrates important features of vote caging 
as a discriminatory phenomenon.  Political operatives belonging to 
one party caged voters who were predominantly members of ethnic 
minority groups likely to vote for the other party.  The caging 
consisted of using do-not-forward letters to identify people who 
might not be properly registered.  Then, on election day, at least 
some of the partisan operatives—including lawyers—went beyond 
simply asking election officials to challenge the voters who were on 
the caging list.  In some cases, the operatives attempted to apply 
literacy tests and were abrasive and threatening.  Their intervention 
sometimes slowed the lines of voters.  Moreover, they sometimes 
broke the election law by arrogating to themselves the roles of 
challenging the voters’ registration and of applying literacy tests 
when those roles were legally assigned to election officials. 
IV. VOTE CAGING SINCE THE 1960S 
America is a large nation with thousands of elections every year 
at every level of government.  There is no systematic effort by 
government, political activists, or scholars to scientifically 
monitor—either in toto or using statistical sampling techniques—
vote suppression efforts.  Hence, it would be impossible to estimate 
accurately how widespread caging has been since Rehnquist’s 
involvement in it almost fifty years ago. 
The authors of this article wrote a report in 2004 that focused 
on some of the more widely reported instances of vote caging since 
the post-World War II era.166  There was, for example, the 
Republican Party’s national ballot security program in 1964, named 
Operation Eagle Eye.167  In addition, the RNC was involved in vote 
caging during the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election.  This 
incident led to a 1982 consent decree in the court of Judge 
Dickinson R. Debevoise, prohibiting either the RNC or the 
Democratic National Committee from engaging in some of the 
 166. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24. 
 167. Id. at 25. 
27
Davidson et al.: Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
DAVIDSON - ADC 1/31/2008  11:00:49 AM 
560 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
more egregious forms of vote suppression—in particular, racial 
targeting.168  In 1986, a major caging effort by Republicans in a 
Louisiana senatorial race was enjoined by a federal judge, which 
led to the RNC being required to appear before Judge Debevoise 
once again and agree to submit all its future ballot security 
programs to his court for approval—an agreement still in effect.169  
There was ample evidence that the vote caging was racially 
targeted.  An RNC operative in Louisiana wrote to a fellow 
operative in 1986, “I would guess that this program will eliminate at 
least 60-80,000 folks from the rolls. . . .  If it’s a close race . . . which 
I’m assuming it is, this could keep the black vote down 
considerably.”170
Another widely noted example of caging occurred in the 1990 
North Carolina contest between Republican U.S. Senator Jesse 
Helms and his black Democratic challenger Harvey Gantt.171  In 
that contest, the state Republican apparatus in conjunction with 
the Helms campaign sent out two mailings of first-class mail 
postcards containing false and threatening information.172  The first 
(81,000 cards) was sent to precincts in which ninety-four percent of 
the voters were black, and the second (44,000 cards) was sent 
exclusively to black voters.173  The Gantt campaign reported 
instances in which biracial couples received cards addressed only to 
the black member of the family.174  One of the purposes of both 
mailings was to obtain a list of black registrants whose cards were 
returned as undeliverable, in order to challenge them at the polls 
on election day.175
In the wake of Goodling’s May 2007 testimony, reports by non-
profit organizations have shed more light on caging and its history.  
The Brennan Center for Justice presented a chronological account 
 168. Id. at 48–49.  See Consent Order, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican 
Nat’l Comm., Civ. No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982). 
 169. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 60. 
 170. Thomas B. Edsall, “Ballot Security” Effects Calculated; GOP Aide Said 
Louisiana Effort “Could Keep the Black Vote Down,” WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1986, at A1. 
 171. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 72. 
 172. Michael Isikoff, Justice Dept. Investigates GOP Mailings to Voters, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 6, 1990, at A6. 
 173. Levitt & Allison, Reported Instances of Vote Caging, supra note 21, at 1–5. 
 174. Isikoff, supra note 172, at A6. 
 175. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. N.C. 
Republican Party, No. 91-161-CIU 5 F, 5–9 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 1992). 
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from the early years in Arizona mentioned above to five instances 
in 2004 in Ohio, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Wisconsin.176
Other actual or intended voter challenges by Republicans in 
2002 or later, which may have involved caging lists derived from 
techniques other than direct mail, are mentioned by Teresa James 
of Project Vote.  She documents instances that occurred in 
Wisconsin in 2002 and 2004; North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Kentucky in 2004; Washington in 2005; and New York 
in 2006.177
Events in Wisconsin in 2004 indicate a new twist to caging 
techniques, which James calls “virtual caging.”178  As she describes it: 
In lieu of an expensive and time-consuming direct mail 
caging operation, the 2004 Wisconsin Republican 
operation was unique in that it used a computer program 
to identify and scrutinize registered voters.  The 
Republican group first used freedom-of-information laws 
to obtain the names of new voters, and then ran 
background checks on them, according to a 
contemporary Wall Street Journal report.  Republicans 
checked the addresses of more than 300,000 people 
registered to vote in Milwaukee with a software program 
used by the U.S. Postal Service to determine if addresses 
were valid.  Armed with the results of the virtual caging 
operation, the Republican Party filed challenges against 
the registrations of about 5,600 Milwaukee voters just 
three minutes before the deadline.  As in other states, the 
party then launched a major media campaign to disclose 
its findings and lodge charges of voter fraud.179
In most or all the above accounts of caging, the authors have 
presumably relied on random media accounts or lawyers connected 
to political parties.  Another approach to ascertaining the extent of 
this technique would involve a systematic tally of potential caging 
problems throughout the country, as reported to vote-protection 
hotlines in national elections.  One such hotline project has 
recently reported its tally of all complaints, not necessarily involving 
caging, from voters in 2006.180  Conducted under the auspices of 
 176. Levitt & Allison, Reported Instances of Vote Caging, supra note 21, at 1–5. 
 177. James, supra note 21, at 21–25. 
 178. Id. at 21. 
 179. Id. 
 180. CHRISTOPHER PATUSKY ET AL., MYVOTE1 NATIONAL ELECTION REPORT: VOICE 
OF THE ELECTORATE 2006, 7 (2007), http://www.fels.upenn.edu/Reports/myvote1 
_report_8_20_07.pdf. 
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the Fels Institute of Government at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Project MyVote1 found a slight rise from 2004 to 2006 (from 4.0 to 
5.4) in the percentage of hotline complaints of coercion.181  
Coercion was defined as intentional bad behavior “including 
harassment by campaign or polling place workers inside or just 
outside the polling place,” as distinct from poor administration.182  
While constituting a small proportion of all problems on Election 
Day, these data suggest that problems sometimes associated with a 
caging operation still occur widely and are perhaps increasing.183
In the current politically-charged atmosphere, when many 
Republicans assert that Democratic vote fraud is rampant, it 
appears likely that vote caging, both in its traditional direct-mail 
version and its more imaginative forms, will continue to  be part of 
the Republican arsenal.184  Whether it will be effective in 
suppressing votes depends on several factors that are beyond the 
scope of this essay.  Among them are the willingness of Republicans 
to risk the bad publicity that accompanies publicly exposed illegal 
vote-caging efforts, as well as the aggressiveness of both the media 
and election-protection organizations in identifying and exposing 
such efforts.185  These factors, in turn, may themselves be 
influenced by the outcome of the continuing investigation of the 
facts surrounding the sudden firing of U.S. attorneys by the Bush 
administration in 2006, including the facts concerning the caging 
lists sent by Timothy Griffin alluded to in the congressional 
testimony of Monica Goodling.186
 181. Id. at 6. 
 182. Id. at 7. 
 183. Id. at 7. 
 184. For more discussion of Republican claims about Democratic vote fraud, 
see DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 25–26 (explaining that the Republican 
national campaign, Operation Eagle Eye, was implemented specifically to counter 
expected Democratic fraud); see also LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER 
FRAUD (2007) available at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/ 
Publications/Politics_of_Voter_Fraud_Final.pdf (finding little evidence of voter 
fraud); Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Voter-Fraud Complaints by GOP Drove Dismissals, 
WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4 (reporting that recent U.S. Attorney firings were 
the result of Republican Justice Department officials targeting those seen weak on 
prosecuting voter fraud). 
 185. A useful summary of litigation regarding discriminatory vote caging and 
ways to prevent it is found in James, supra note 21, at 26–35. 
 186. See McClure & Schwartz, supra note 3. 
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